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In front of the train station in Menemen 
the municipality band was dissonantly 
playing old nationalist marches while 
the people behind waived Turkish flags 
of all sizes. The march began when the 
mayor arrived and led the crowd to 
the ceremony area on the top of the 
nearby hill, which is protected by the 
army as a military zone. This isolation 
of the monument from the town is 
a spatial reflection of the gap between the national history imposed 
from above and local memories which are often unheard or unwritten. 
Hence, this monument deserves a special focus as a “realm of memo-
ry,”2 a space where memory is contested. The history of the monument 
and the commemorations show first of all how the icon of Kubilay has 
been used in the secularist discourse as a symbol of struggle against 
religious fanaticism. Secondly, the local reception of this monument 
reveals that the memory of Kubilay has been highly contested both on 
a national and a local scale.
Official memory
After the Menemen Incident, the Kemalist elite were determined to 
keep the memory of Kubilay alive. In 1931, the daily newspaper Cum-
huriyet initiated a campaign for the building of a Kubilay Monument 
in Menemen. According to the originator of this idea, Nadir Nadi, the 
son of the owner of Cumhuriyet, such a campaign would strengthen 
people’s emotional attachment to the Revolution; and thanks to the 
monument Kubilay would be remembered as a legendary figure in the 
national history.3
The monument dedicated to the memory of Kubilay and the two vil-
lage guards who were martyred during the incident was erected on a 
hill outside Menemen in 1934 making them the only people, besides 
Atatürk himself, in whose name a monumental statue 
was erected. The monument depicts a castle—symbol of 
the Republic—protected by a figure holding a spear. En-
graved on it is: “They believed, fought, and died; we are 
the guardians of the trust they left behind.” During the 
official opening of the monument, emotional ceremonies 
were held while 20,000 people gathered in Menemen and 
listened to the speech made by the General Secretary of 
the CHP (Republican People’s Party, the single-party rul-
ing the country between 1923 and 1950).4 
Between oblivion and remembering 
However, Kubilay has not always been remembered 
during the course of the Republican period. A clear pat-
tern can be observed by tracing the coverage of the 
“Kubilay, the Martyr Day” from the 1930s onwards, in the 
daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, which had played a crucial 
role in the institutionalization of the commemorations.
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Kubilay was almost forgot-
ten, since the press did not report about the commemo-
rations held annually in Menemen. The revival of Kubilay, 
the martyr, coincided with the transformation of the sec-
ularist discourse in the 1950s when the CHP lost power 
and the government was no longer identified with Ke-
malist secularism. In the new context of multi-party poli-
tics, Islam became a useful tool of populist politics, while 
secularism, the founding ideology of the Republic, was 
transformed into a weapon of the opposition. Thus, Kubi-
lay became an ideal icon for this secularism in opposition 
which has gradually developed a victim psychology.
Memorializing 
Atatürk and 
Kubilay at 
the Menemen 
monument, 
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Kubilay
Icon of Secularism
Early in the morning of 23 December 
2007, four municipality buses were 
lined in front of the town hall of Izmir 
to take the members of the Kemal-
ist Thought Society to Menemen, an 
inland district of Izmir. However, only 
one bus turned out to be sufficient for 
the whole group composed of Kemal-
ist activists of all ages. The Society had 
organized the trip in order to partici-
pate in a ceremony, which has been held every winter for the past 76 
years.
The ceremony commemorates Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, a schoolteacher 
and reserve officer killed in the so-called Menemen Incident, a local rebel-
lion against the secular regime on 23 December 1930.1 The young officer 
was beheaded by a self-proclaimed Mahdi and his companions who want-
ed to restore the Islamic law and the Caliphate. The state’s reaction was a 
violent restoration of its authority by announcing martial law; arresting 
2,200 persons; trying 600 of them; and sentencing 37 suspects to capital 
punishment on the charges of high treason. Among those sentenced to 
death were Shaykh Esad (1848-1931), a famous Naqshbandi shaykh, and 
his son, as well as several other shaykhs, villagers, and townspeople who 
had allegedly collaborated with the rebels.
The rebellion has been depicted by the state as a conspiracy of 
the Naqshbandi order, which had been outlawed in 1925, and irticai 
hareket (a major reactionary movement) against the secular republic. 
Moreover, Kubilay acquired a central position in the iconography of the 
Republic as “the martyr of Revolution.” Since 1997, the icon of Kubilay 
has been revived by Kemalist associations, the army, and the main-
stream media as a way to express and restore citizens’ dedication to 
the secularist regime. The people travelling to Menemen in December 
2007 had the same intent. 
Located on a hilltop in Menemen, Izmir, 
the monument to Turkey’s “first martyr of 
secularism,” Kubilay, has recently become a 
major site for the defenders of secularism 
against the AKP government. Isolated from 
the town below and surrounded by competing 
sacred sites, this monument reflects the gap 
between national history and alternative 
local histories.
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The first time Kubilay appeared on the front page of the newspaper 
was in 1952 after the so-called Malatya Incident, an assassination at-
tempt against Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1972), a famous liberal jour-
nalist. Yalman had been portrayed by conservative nationalist intel-
lectuals as an enemy of Islam because of his alleged membership to 
the Freemason Society, his role in organizing beauty contests, and 
his defence of secularism vis-à-vis the increasing public visibility of 
Islamic religiosity. Invoking the memory of the Menemen Incident, 
Cumhuriyet editors warned the public and the Democratic Party gov-
ernment, which had replaced the CHP in the general elections of 
1950, against the anti-secular reactionary forces which could “abuse 
democracy” by propagating anti-secularist ideas and even use brutal 
violence to reach their aims.
In the mid-1960s, the socialist movement appropriated Kubilay as the 
symbol of their struggle against conservative nationalists, seen as new 
reactionaries. Reaction, in the left-wing secularist discourse, gained the 
wider meaning of economic and cultural regression, while the Kemalist 
revolution was reinterpreted as the beginning of the anti-imperialist 
struggle and an uncompleted enlightenment movement. In the follow-
ing decades, Kubilay was remembered as a martyr, especially during 
social and ideological tensions which resulted in violent social clashes, 
such as those in 1969 and 1978.
On the event of Bloody Sunday on 16 January 1969, left-wing stu-
dents demonstrating against American imperialism in Taksim, Istanbul, 
were attacked (and two murdered) by right-wing groups who accused 
them of communism and infidelity. In the following days, Cumhuriyet 
columnists referred to Kubilay as the revolutionary forerunner of the 
murdered leftist students and as a symbol of anti-imperialism and 
revolution.
In 1978, however, the victim of right-wing ultra-nationalist conserva-
tive movement was the Alevis, the non-Sunni population, of the city of 
Kahramanmaraş. Historically, the Alevis have been demeaned by the 
Sunni centre as a heretic and irreligious group and recently were as-
sociated with the leftist movement. In December 1978, the quarters 
inhabited by Alevis in Kahramanmaraş were ruined by right-wing Sunni 
gangs, and 111 persons were killed while hundreds were injured. The 
attackers used the slogan “Muslim Turkey” and targeted also the build-
ings of the RPP and all left-wing institutions and organizations. The vio-
lence of the event again invoked the memory of Kubilay. Those who 
massacred the Alevis were depicted by Cumhuriyet writers as the suc-
cessors of the reactionaries of the 1930s who had beheaded Kubilay.
In short, the victims of all these events have been seen as new Kubi-
lays martyred by a timeless, abstract enemy referred to as “dark forces” 
or “reaction.” The theme of martyrdom was stressed especially in the 
1980s and 1990s following the assassinations of the secularist profes-
sors and journalists Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, and 
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, who were all seen as “martyrs of secularism” like 
Kubilay.
The last discovery of Kubilay as a symbol of secularism, however, 
occurred in the 1990s when the army designated Islamism the major 
threat to national security. From 1997 onwards, after the Islamist politi-
cal party began receiving wider popular support, the army invoked the 
memory of Kubilay, with the motive of protecting the secularist regime 
even at the expense of democracy. Since the AKP government took 
power in November 2002, commemoration ceremonies in Menemen 
became platforms for the army as well as the opposition parties and 
Kemalist associations to protest the government’s allegedly hidden Is-
lamist agenda. The 2007 commemorations were the last of these.
Official memory contested
Although the crowd which gathered this year was much smaller and 
less agitated than in 2006, the programme of the commemoration was 
the same as before. Besides members of the Kemalist Thought Society, 
the ceremony was also attended by the city governor of Izmir, local 
state officials, high commanders of the army, local politicians, and stu-
dents. Routine state rituals were performed in front the monument. 
These were followed by poems and formulaic speeches of students 
and soldiers chosen by their teachers or commanders for their talent 
in emotive oratory. The ceremony was interrupted by applauds of the 
audience and their shouting of the slogan “Turkey is secular and will 
remain secular!” All speakers paid their respect to Kubilay’s memory 
and promised to follow his path if necessary for protecting the secular 
republic.
Except for a few teachers, students, local politicians, and local Kemal-
ist activists, hardly anybody from Menemen attended the commem-
oration ceremony. It was understandable: Since 1930, the Menemen 
population has found itself in an awkward situation as their town has 
become notorious as the embodiment of religious reaction. The of-
ficial memory about the Menemen Incident has resulted in the stig-
matization of the townspeople as religious fanatics. Every male person 
in Menemen recalls the moment during his military service when his 
commander shouted at him and accused him of being “the murderer 
of Kubilay.” Townspeople have been extremely disturbed by this stig-
matization and as a backlash, they have boycotted commemoration 
ceremonies at the monument site. Many express their sorrow for being 
blemished by such commemorations; some even express the need to 
demolish the monument in order to erase this unjust association of the 
town with religious fanaticism.
To resist such associations, townspeople feel also obliged to assert 
themselves as true secularists. They blame a neighbour town (Manisa) 
for the incident, because the group of rebels had in fact come to Mene-
men from there. The monument and the annual ceremonies, according 
to locals, reinforce a shameful episode of history of which they were not 
responsible and which they want to forget. They all sadly know about 
Atatürk’s unrealized wish to depopulate the town as a punishment for 
their alleged collaboration with the rebels. Similarly, they remember 
not only Kubilay’s martyrdom, but also the horrifying scenes of 28 per-
sons who were hanged at gallows set in the streets of Menemen in Feb-
ruary 1931. In other words, if the local people’s memory does not con-
sciously challenge the national memory embodied by the monument, 
it certainly resists it by attempting to insert their own realities.
This is also shown by the existence of different but more popular holy 
ziyaret (visit) centres at the foot of the hill. One of them is a mosque, 
which hides in its basement the tombs of Shaykh Esad and his son, 
the alleged leaders of the rebellion of 1930. This mosque is today a pil-
grimage place for the Naqshbandi successors of 
Shaykh Esad. Here, instead of Kubilay, this Shaykh 
is accepted as the real victim of the Menemen 
Incident, while the latter is seen as a fake event 
staged by the Kemalist state.5 Further up between 
this mosque and the monument is another tomb 
which is said to be hosting Hızır, a pre-Islamic cult 
of spring and new life. This tomb is the favour-
ite sacred site for those desiring special boons 
such as getting married or giving birth to a child, 
etc. Thousands of people visit here every year in 
spring, pray and then wait for their wish to be re-
alized. In other words, the sacred space of secular-
ism is circumscribed by other and more popular 
sacred sites.
The Monument of Kubilay in Menemen was 
erected by the political elite of the 1930s on top of 
a hill dominating the town. However, to be placed 
at a high location does not mean that its presence 
affects the everyday life of the people below. Peo-
ple resist the domination of the national memory 
in several ways: nationally, Naqshbandis defy the 
official history by stressing the martyrdom of 
their Shaykh instead of Kubilay, while the locals 
want to forget the event, ignore the commemo-
rations and attempt to revise the official account 
by playing down their involvement in the rebel-
lion by naming it as “Kubilay Incident” instead of 
“Menemen Incident.” In short, the national memo-
ry represented by the monument is far away from 
being hegemonic. Like the monument on the hill, 
it keeps its dominance, but not without the chal-
lenge of alternative and local memories.
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